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I. INTRODUCTION
The intended purpose of the Medicare system is to provide the elderly
and disabled with adequate health care in order to create a healthier, more
financially secure society.1 As a Commonwealth of the United States, Puerto
Rico is privy to the benefits of the Medicare program and is also subject to
the regulations set out under the program.2 As such, Puerto Rico contributes
to the Medicare fund based on the same rates as all other Medicare partici-
pants, but Puerto Rico only gets reimbursed a portion of the benefits that the
* J.D. Candidate 2005, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center;
B.S., Nova Southeastern University, Farquhar College of Arts and Sciences, 2001. The author
wishes to give a special thanks to his family and friends for all the love and support during the
course of his educational career. The author would also like to acknowledge the entire Nova
Law Review staff for their much appreciated assistance in the editing of this Note. Lastly, the
author would like to dedicate this Note to his late "Papa", Antonio Olivo, "con todo mi amor y
carrifio."
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2000); PETER A. CORNING, THE EVOLUTION OF MEDICARE...
FROM IDEA TO LAW 30-32 (1969).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(9) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat
2066 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(9)(E)); Hosp. San Rafael, Inc. v. Sullivan, 784
F. Supp. 927, 930 (D.P.R. 1991); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, 42 C.F.R. §§
412.200-.220 (2003).
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states receive. Since 1987, Puerto Rico's hospitals have been subject to a
special Medicare reimbursement rate based on just a portion of the national
rate utilized by all other hospitals in the states.4 The special rate results in
lower payment levels for the participating hospitals on the island, which in
turn makes it more difficult for the elderly and disabled on the island to re-
ceive the medical care they need.5 Since the incorporation of the unequal
rates, significant improvements have been developed; however, there is still
much ground to make before Puerto Rico reaches the parity it seeks to ob-
tain.6 This article will discuss the purpose and effect of the Medicare pro-
gram and how the program is unequally applied to Puerto Rico.
Part II of this article will track the history and reasons behind the crea-
tion of the Medicare program. Part III will discuss the reforms that the sys-
tem has undergone since its creation in 1965, and the social and economical
impact it has had on the citizens of the United States. Part IV will discuss
the Medicare program as applied to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, with
a focus on the special reimbursement rate imposed on Puerto Rico. Part V
will conclude with a brief analysis of the facts and how they support elimi-
nating the unequal reimbursement rate.
II. THE LONG JOURNEY OF MEDICARE
In the United States, the concept that the government should contribute
to the health care of its citizens started long before Lyndon B. Johnson
signed Medicare into law.7 Early in the twentieth century, with the begin-
ning of the Industrial Revolution, labor practices heightened the focus on
welfare matters.8 Organizations such as the American Association for Labor
Legislation ("AALL") began making a push toward health care legislation
that protected workers.9 However, in the early 1900s health care issues were
3. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.200-.220; § 1395ww(d)(9); Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 930.
4. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 930.
5. See Congressional Committees Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare - Why..
New Territories Staffers in Committees, P.R. HERALD, June 13, 2003, at
http://www.puertorico-herald.org/issues/2003/vo17n24/WashUpdateO724-en.shtml [hereinaf-
ter Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare]; Noticias, Anibal Acevedo Vili, Presidente Bush
Convierte en Ley Reforma al Medicare: Significativo el Impacto Sobre Puerto Rico (Dec. 7,
2003) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Significativo el Impacto].
6. See § 1395ww(d)(9); Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 930; Move to Increase Puerto Rico
Medicare, supra note 5.
7. CORNING, supra note 1, at 120.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 6-7. The organization led a campaign requiring employers to insure their
workers against industrial accidents and they created a Social Insurance Committee in order to
spot issues and come up with solutions. Id. By 1915, the AALL managed to influence thirty
[Vol_ 29:2:311
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mainly handled within the states; this made it particularly difficult to imple-
ment any national welfare proposal since implementation had to be done on a
state-by-state basis.'" In the early part of the twentieth century, Americans
had the attitude that less government intervention was best for state issues
such as health care." Despite the majority philosophy, Theodore Roosevelt
based his 1912 campaign on the "New Nationalism," which contained ideas
for a number of social welfare programs, including government health insur-
ance. 12 Not surprisingly, Roosevelt was heavily criticized. 3  The obvious
lack of support brought the idea of government health insurance to an early
halt and foreshadowed the difficulties to come."
The United States was fond of private enterprise and independence,
which acted as a large blockade to mandatory nation-wide health insurance. I"
Furthermore, states were reluctant in adopting mandatory social welfare leg-
islation fearing that such legislation would place them at a disadvantage on
the national economic level.' 6 Despite the unfavorable positions presented
on both the state and national level, implementation of a broad social welfare
system would best be achieved on the federal level. 17 The Great Depression
of the 1930s created a vast sense of vulnerability amongst the United States
citizens and provided an opportune moment to push for a nation-wide health
care program. 18
In 1932, Franklin Roosevelt, the newly elected president, came into of-
fice with change in mind.'9 Roosevelt, through his "Fireside Chats" and pro-
posed "New Deal," provided great comfort to Americans during a time of
economic struggle.2" At this time, his inter-dependence ideas were widely
accepted. 2' The birth of the Social Security Act sprouted out of the many
federal organizations and administrations established under the Roosevelt
administration. 2 In 1934, Roosevelt assembled the Committee on Economic
states to implement laws mandating employers to insure their workers against industrial acci-
dents. Id.
10. CORNING, supra note 1, at 120.
11. Id. at 11-12.
12. Id.
13. Id. at9, 11.
14. See id.
15. CORNING, supra note 1, at 11-12.
16. Id. at 12-13.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 29.
19. Id.
20. CORNING, supra note 1, at 29.
21. Id. at 30.
22. Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89
CAL. L. REv. 569, 585 (2001); CORNING, supra note 1, at 30. Among the many agencies
2005]
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Security to investigate what issues were creating the most problems for eco-
nomic security of individuals, to investigate all forms of social insurances,
and to formulate possible solutions to the problem.23 The results of the com-
mittee study were not definitive; however, health insurance and unemploy-
ment insurance were the leading concerns.24 Roosevelt's strong push for
nation-wide health care slowly died down as opposition grew from conserva-
tives in Congress25 and as pressure grew from the American Medical Asso-
ciation ("AMA").26 The AMA represented the voice of American physicians
who strongly opposed the idea of any national health care system because of
fear that it would open the door to excessive government intrusion.27 In spite
of the AMA's strong opposition and Roosevelt's passiveness, the Social Se-
curity Act survived heavy scrutiny and was signed on August 14, 1935.28
The signing of the Social Security Act was a tremendous accomplishment
and paved the road for Medicare.29
The outlook of the national health care system was particularly incon-
sistent throughout the 1930s and 1940s.30 In the late 1930s a strong wave of
pro-national health insurance arose, only to be dissolved by the preoccupa-
tion of the start of World War II and the death of President Roosevelt.3 In
established by the Roosevelt administration in an attempt to remedy the country's economic
struggle were the: Civil Works Administration (CWA); Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC);
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA); National Recovery Administration
(NRA); and Public Works Administration (PWA). CORNING, supra note 1, at 30.
23. William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 207
(2001); CORNING, supra note 1, at 30-31. The report was given a deadline of December 1,
1934, and the list of possible programs that would assist the economic state of the country
ranged from accident insurance and unemployment insurance to retirement annuities and
health insurance. CORNING, supra note 1, at 30-31.
24. CORNING, supra note 1, at 30-31.
25. Theodore R. Marmor & Gary J. McKissick, Medicare's Future: Fact, Fiction and
Folly, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 227 (2000); CORNING, supra note 1, at 41.
26. Emily Friedman, The Compromise and the Afterthought: Medicare and Medicaid
After 30 Years, 274 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 278, 279 (1995).
27. See CORNING, supra note 1, at 16.
28. Id. at41.
29. See id. After the signing of the Social Security Act, the Social Security Board was
created under section 702 of the Social Security Act. Id.
30. See id.
31. CORNING, supra note 1, at 51-52. The National Health Conference, held in July of
1938, created a lot of great publicity for a national health plan and placed pressure on the
leading opposition (AMA) to take a public stance as to the health care issue in the country. Id.
In February of 1939, the "Wagner Bill," featuring improvements to the Social Security pro-
gram, was proposed. Id. The bill was unsuccessful due to the combination of AMA's strong
campaigning against the bill and the President's inability to support the bill due to his preoc-
cupation with the start of WWII. Id. Roosevelt's death in 1945 also posed as another gloomy
[Vol. 29:2:311
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the 1940s Harry S. Truman was another pro-national health insurance presi-
dent.32 He also made a push for health insurance but was interrupted with the
rise of domestic anti-communism and an economic plummet.33 By 1949, the
polls indicated that favoritism toward government health plummeted to 51
percent and that private insurance coverage amongst the population more
than doubled since 1946. 3"
In an attempt to place a more appealing spin on an openly dissatisfying
proposal, Merril G. Murray, an official of the Social Security Administration,
introduced an idea that originated during the Truman administration.
5
Murray suggested that "[g]overnment health insurance be limited (at least at
first) to social security beneficiaries., 36 Limiting government health insur-
ance was appealing to the Social Security Administration. 37 The idea was
particularly appealing because limiting the beneficiary class to the elderly
citizens addressed an already existing objective, namely, to "protect against
the greatest single cause of economic dependency in old age-the high cost
of medical care., 38 A 1950 census showed that the population of elderly
people was growing rapidly and that two-thirds of them made less than
$1000 per year.39 The numbers clearly exemplified the necessity elderly
people had for health insurance.4" Murray's suggestion of limiting medical
care to the elderly provided an attractive twist to an old issue.41
event for a national health care system. Friedman, supra note 26, at 279. However, Truman
picked up where Roosevelt left off with the introduction of the "Fair Deal." Id.
32. Daniel R. Berg, M.D., A History of Health Care for the Indigent in St. Louis: 1904-
2001, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 191, 203 (2003).
33. CORNING, supra note 1, at 58.
34. Id. at 67; see also Amy E. RADICH, M.S. IV, A BRIEF HIsTORY OF THE HEALTHCARE
INDUSTRY IN AMERICA http://www.ooanet.org/pdf/OUCOMManagedcare.pdf (last visited Feb.
2, 2005). By 1950, about 60 percent of the population had at least hospitalization coverage
through private insurance, which was more than double the amount in 1946, when only about
25 percent of the population had private coverage of any kind. CORNING, supra note 1, at 67.
35. CORNING, supra note 1, at 71. The idea of limiting government health insurance to
social security beneficiaries was first suggested by Dr. Thomas Parran of the Public Health
Service, in 1937. Id. The idea was never pursued and was forgotten until Murray suggested it
again in 1944. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 72.
38. CORNING, supra, note 1, at 72.
39. Id. Coming mentioned that "[t]he 1950 census showed that the aged population had
grown from 3 million in 1900 to 12 million in 1950, or from 4 to 8 percent of the total popula-
tion. Two-thirds of these people had income of less than $1,000 annually, and only 1 in 8 had
health insurance." Id.
40. Id. at 72-73. Despite the necessity that the elderly had for health insurance, private
insurance coverage was not always the answer. See id. The older generation presented a
higher risk for the private insurance companies; thus, the private insurance companies would
2005]
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The initial step of implementing universal medical care for the elderly
began in 1950, when the federal government enacted a program that pro-
vided "direct payments to 'medical vendors' for the treatment of welfare
clients, including the elderly. 42 The "medical vendors" program was a pre-
cursor to national health insurance; however, support for the highly debated
topic declined in the early to mid-1950s. 43 The decline in popularity of na-
tional health insurance during the mid-1950s was mainly attributed to Presi-
dent Eisenhower's administration and its support for private insurance cover-
age.44
The national health insurance issue did not quiet down for long.45 The
activities in Congress soon rallied talks again. 6 By 1957, the government
health insurance proposal received much needed support when the Labor
Federations and the American Hospital Association ("AHA") got involved.47
Ironically, hospitals, unlike physicians, favored nationwide health insur-
ance.48 Because hospitals, much like the elderly, faced economic difficulties
concerning health care expenses, it was no wonder that hospitals favored a
government insurance system.4 ' As usual, the AMA did not miss a beat in
the government health insurance system debate, but this time the AMA was
willing to compromise." In an effort to address the obvious economic prob-
increase their premiums or choose not to cover them at all. CORNING, supra note 1, at 72-73;
see also RADICH, supra note 34.
41. See CORNING, supra note 1, at 72-73.
42. Id. at 73.
43. See id. at 74-75.
44. Friedman, supra note 26, at 279.
45. See CORNING, supra note 1, at 74-76.
46. Id. Four events during the 1956 session of Congress helped rally the issue of gov-
ernment health insurance: 1) the enactment of a Military Medicare Program, which gave
government health protection to dependents of servicemen; 2) an expansion of payments to
medical vendors in order to provide more medical care for welfare clients; 3) the approval, by
Congress, of a $30,000 study focusing on problems of the aged (the study resulted in a Senate
sub-committee that ultimately became a forum for national health care talks); and 4) the
struggle to add totally and permanently disabled persons aged fifty and older to the list of
social security cash beneficiaries. Id. Many physicians opposed this last measure because of
fear that the government would be able to manipulate medical practice, even though the bill
specifically required that physicians make the determinations themselves. Id.
47. Id. at 78.
48. Friedman, supra note 26, at 278-79.
49. CORNING, supra note 1, at 78. The burden on the hospitals was so heavy that
"[m]any hospital officials viewed this growing problem as a threat to the very existence of the
private hospital system." Id.
50. Id. at 80.
[Vol. 29:2:311
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lems faced by the elderly, the AMA advocated for doctors to cut medical
fees for elderly people. 1
Once again things settled down for a while in the late 1950s.2 There
were a number of proposed bills and suggestions that were mostly unsuccess-
ful. 5' Then came the "Mills Bill" of 1960, which provided the largest break
in universal health care since the creation of the "medical vendors" payment
plan in 1950.51 With the cooperation of the AMA, Chairman Mills devised a
plan that intended to expand the state run medical vendor program.55 The
expansion involved the creation of a new assistance category called "medical
indigency," which was intended for elderly citizens who needed assistance
with their medical expenses but did not qualify for welfare benefits. 6 The
"Mills Bill" presented a number of features that were appealing to both na-
tional health partisans and non-partisans. 7 In summary,
[The Bill] was more modest in cost and scope than either the
Forand bill or the Republican "subsidy" plan; from a technical
standpoint it was a logical first step; it was a "Democratic bill" in a
Democratic Congress and was sponsored by the respected Ways
and Means Committee chairman; and, not least, it had the backing
of the AMA."
The Mills proposal (H.R. 12580) received immediate approval and
swept right through the Ways and Means Committee, House Rules Commit-
tee, and the House of Representatives.5 9 The proposal was modified and
amended once it reached the Senate, but the "Mills Bill," later re-named the
"Kerr-Mills Bill," was finally signed into law (Public Law 86-778) on Sep-
51. Id. The AMA preferred that physicians and hospitals address the issue on their own,
rather than promoting government intervention. Id.
52. Friedman, supra note 26, at 279.
53. Will Mallon, What is Medicare?, CTR. FOR HISTORY GEO. MASON, July 21, 2003, at
http://www.historynewsnetwork.com/articles/1583.html; see also CORNING, supra note 1, at
83-85. The "Flemming Bill," which was proposed to assist states in subsidizing private
health insurance premiums for low income elderly by providing federal grants, was just one
proposal that arose and was quietly put to rest during the Eisenhower administration.
CORNING, supra note 1, at 83. The "Forand Bill" was yet another casualty of the times. Id. at
83-85.
54. CORNING, supra note 1, at 83-85.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 85.
57. CORNING, supra note 1, at 85.
58. Id.
59. Id.
2005]
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tember 13, 1960.60 The "Kerr-Mills Bill" marked the first time that a pro-
spective health insurance proposal obtained a floor vote in the United States
Senate and was approved. 6' Although government health insurance advo-
cates were not fully satisfied with the bill, it served as a significant building
block.62
Despite the now newly enacted Kerr-Mills Act, the pressure for national
health insurance for the elderly persisted.63 Senator John F. Kennedy based
his campaign for presidency on a pro-Medicare stance and won the elec-
tion.64 The beginning of President Kennedy's term was preoccupied with a
mild recession, but nonetheless, Kennedy eventually brought the focus back
to his proposed Medicare plan.65 The push for Medicare was propelled by
the inadequacy of the Kerr-Mills Act.66 Through the first eighteen months of
the Act's implementation, reports showed that only 88,000 elderly citizens,
spread mainly throughout only four states, benefited from the Act.67  The
inability for the elderly to cover medical expenses began to weigh heavily on
private insurance companies because medical treating facilities began to off-
set their losses by increasing costs of medical services across the board.68
Furthermore, the elderly population continued to grow while the average cost
for hospital care increased at a rate of 6.7 percent per year.69
As a result of the disappointing numbers for the Kerr-Mills Act, the
predominant number of Democrats both in the House and in the Senate, and
Kennedy as President, the stage was set for Medicare to prevail. 70 However,
the moment was cut short when President Kennedy was assassinated in
60. Id. at 85-86. The Democrats favored the government health insurance embodied in
the bill, while the Republicans modified the bill with a "subsidy" plan. Id. at 86. Both sug-
gestions were defeated and the differences between the parties were resolved in a Senate-
House conference, which eventually led to the signing of the bill into law. CORNING, supra
note 1, at 86.
61. Id. at 86-87.
62. See Donald R. Wolfensberger, Federal Involvment in Healthcare: An Historic Per-
spective, An Introductory Essay for the Congress Project Seminar on Congress and Health-
care Policy, Sept. 13, 2004, http://wwics.si.edu/events/docs/hlthcare-essay.pdf.
63. See CORNING, supra note 1, at 87.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 88-89.
66. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY, MEDICARE, at http://college.hmco.com/history/reader
comp/rcah/html/ah_058600_medicare.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter MEDICARE].
67. CORNING, supra note 1, at 93-98.
68. Id. at 102-03. Only fifty percent of the elderly population was privately covered in
1963. Id.
69. Id. at 101-02. The elderly population grew from 12 million, or 8.1 percent of the
total population, in 1950 to 17.5 million, or 9.4 percent of the total population, by 1963. Id.
70. See CORNING, supra note 1, at 104.
[Vol. 29:2:311
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1963.71 Lyndon B. Johnson became President and immediately picked up
where Kennedy left off.72 President Johnson managed to utilize the public
sentiment to get many Kennedy endorsed bills to be passed, but the Medicare
bill was not one of the successfully passed bills.73
It was not until the introduction of the King-Anderson bill that Medi-
care made its final break-through.74 Initially, the King-Anderson bill was
denied by the Ways and Means Committee, but the bill managed to linger
around long enough to obtain Senate approval. 75 The bill underwent a num-
ber of revisions and by spring of 1965, it was introduced on the House floor
as the "Mills Bill" (H.R. 6675). 76 On April 8, 1965, the Mills Bill was ap-
proved by the House of Representatives.77 It took four additional months of
revisions, debates, and amendments before the final version of the bill was
completed and approved by the House and the Senate.78 On July 30, 1965, in
Independence, Missouri, President Johnson signed Medicare into law and the
United States finally had a national health care plan for its elderly.79
III. THE MODERN MEDICARE PROGRAM IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Evolving Medicare Program
The concept of Medicare began as a national health plan, which was to
subsidize medical coverage for the elderly. By 1972, the program expanded
to include coverage for disabled people and those patients with end-stage
renal disease.8° Medicare was an optimistic program, providing health care
71. THE WI-TE HOUSE: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/pres-
idents/lj36.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
72. CORNING, supra note 1, at 106.
73. Id. at 106-07.
74. See id. at 107-09.
75. Wolfensberger, supra note 62, at 5-7. The King-Anderson bill actually failed twice.
CORNING, supra note 1, at 108. However, on its second turn around, there were enough votes
on the floor for the bill to attach to H.R. 11865 as an amendment, even without committee
approval. Id.
76. CORNING, supra note 1, at 113. Chairman Mills finally sided with Medicare and took
it upon himself to revise the King-Anderson bill into its final form, which was then renamed
as the "Mills Bill" (not to be confused with the bill Chairman Mills introduced in 1960). Id.
By the time the bill was approved by the Senate and the House in July of 1965, the bill un-
derwent a total of 513 revisions or amendments. Id.
77. Wolfensberger, supra note 62, at 7.
78. CORNING, supra note 1, at 113-15.
79. Id. at 120.
80. Friedman, supra note 26, at 280,
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security to those in need of assistance.81 However, it did not take long before
the negative effects of the program started to shine through.82 Within the
first couple months after the program began, there were significant increases
in medical expenses across the nation. 3 The increase was attributable to the
following: increased spending on services provided to beneficiaries, an un-
expected increase in the number of Medicare beneficiaries," and the hike in
medical services charges.8 Hospitals and physicians began to take advan-
tage of the favorable payment system in place.86 "Between the years of 1967
and 1971, the daily charges of American hospitals 'increased at' an average
of thirteen percent per year.
87
Creating reforms to impede the inflation of Medicare expenditure be-
came a huge focus during the 1970s.8 Congress attempted to freeze the rise
in spending by developing a number of reform measures, such as: generating
different reimbursement techniques, creating professional review organiza-
tions (to implement national cost controls over hospitals), 9 and creating a
new administration called the Health Care Financing Administration (sepa-
rating Medicare from Social Security).9" One of the reimbursement tech-
niques that temporarily froze the climbing increase in medical expenses dur-
ing the 1970s was the concept of basing the reimbursement rates on a Medi-
care Economic Index ("MEI"). 9' Despite the implementation of the MEI and
other techniques, the national health expenditure continued to increase at a
steadfast pace.92
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (2000).
82. See Friedman, supra note 26, at 280-81.
83. Physician Payments: Hearing on H.L. 12 Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Director, Congressional Budget
Office) http://www.waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/health/ 107Cong/2-28-02/2-28crip.htm
[hereinafter Physician Payments].
84. Friedman, supra note 26, at 280.
85. Physician Payments, supra note 83.
86. Theodore R. Marmor & Gary J. McKissick, Medicare's Future: Fact, Fiction, and
Folly, 26 Am. J.L. & MED. 225, 230 (2000). When hospitals were reimbursed their "reason-
able costs" and physicians were reimbursed their "customary charge," hospitals and physi-
cians began to exploit the system. Id.
87. Id. at 231. The total expenditure for Medicare went up to $7.9 billion in 1971 from
$4.6 billion in 1967. Id. During the spending increase, the total number of Medicare benefi-
ciaries only rose by six percent. Id.
88. Physician Payments, supra note 83.
89. Friedman, supra note 26, at 280.
90. Marmor & McKissick, supra note 86, at 231-32.
91. Physician Payments, supra note 83.
92. Marmor & McKissick, supra note 86, at 232.
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In the 1980s Congress decided to take a more aggressive stance by cre-
ating a completely new reimbursement rate.93 The new plan was to incorpo-
rate a Prospective Payment System ("PPS"), which established a method of
reimbursing hospitals on a fixed rate for each patient discharged no matter
the costs incurred by the hospitals. 94 The PPS reimbursement rate continues
to be utilized today.95 The main incentive behind PPS was to promote cost
efficiency by discouraging hospitals from spending unnecessary time and
resources.96 The reimbursement formula is composed of a three-pronged
system. 97 First, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (the "Secretary") must establish a predetermined national rate for all
patient discharge costs,98 which is done as follows:
PPS is based on a standardized amount that is multiplied by a
weighing factor. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(2)(G), (3)(D). The stan-
dardized amount is a base amount that equals the average Medi-
care allowable costs per discharge for all hospitals participating in
the Medicare program in a base year, which is adjusted according
to regional wage variations, indirect medical education costs, and
hospital case mix. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(2). The weighing fac-
tor is a multiplier based on the diagnosis related group ("DRG") in
which the discharged patient's illness falls. The Secretary has cre-
ated 470 DRGs, each with a weight derived from the relative cost
to treat a patient in that DRG. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(4). 99
Once the predetermined national rate for all patient discharges is deter-
mined, the next step is to determine the amount of reimbursement per Medi-
care patient discharge. °0 At this point, the Secretary must place each par-
ticipating hospital in one of three geographical areas, which are categorized
as "large urban," "other urban," or "rural."'0' The area in which a hospital is
categorized will "determine the hospital's 'average standardized amount per
discharge' payment and the applicable area wage index, and are the organ-
93. Id. at 233.
94. Alvarado Cmty. Hosp. v. Shalala, 155 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(1)).
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (Supp. 2000).
96. Alvarado Cmty. Hosp., 155 F.3d at 1119.
97. See Coalition For Reclassification v. Sullivan, No. 1:92CV242-B-O, 1992 WL
443455, at *1-2 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 25, 1992); Alvarado Cmty. Hosp., 155 F.3d at 1119.
98. Alvarado Cmity. Hosp., 155 F.3d at 1119.
99. Id.
100. Coalition For Reclassification, 1992 WL 443455, at * 1.
101. Id.
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izational basis for reimbursement under the [PPS].' 10 2  Lastly, the system
accounts for "outlier" cases, which are those cases that result in longer and
more expensive treatments than are usually the case for the designated
DRG.1
0 3
The PPS reimbursement rate was first put into practice on October 1,
1983, and it took over four years before the system was applied to all hospi-
tals.' 4 The implementation of PPS considerably slowed down medical ex-
penditures, but it did not provide for a permanent fix. °5 There have been
some payment adjustment programs added to PPS since its inception. °6 One
of the added programs was the Medicare Disproportionate Share ("DSH")
Payments. 0 7 It provides extra financial assistance to hospitals that treat a
larger number of low-income patients.108  Although there have been some
102. Id.
103. Alvarado Cmty. Hosp., 155 F.3d at 1119. The outliers were calculated as follows:
"Day outliers" occur when a patient's length of stay ("LOS"), measured in days,
exceeds the mean LOS for a particular DRG by a fixed number of days or standard
deviations. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(i). "Cost outliers" occur when the cost
exceeds a fixed multiple of a particular DRG's payment rate or when it exceeds the
rate by a fixed dollar amount. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(ii). The amount for
additional payments for these cases "shall be determined by the Secretary and shall
approximate the marginal cost of care" beyond the applicable cut-off point. 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iii). Finally, the statute provides that [t]he total amount
of the additional payments made under this subparagraph for discharges in a fiscal
year may not be less than 5 percent nor more than 6 percent of the total payments
projected or estimated to be made based on DRG prospective payment rates for
discharge in that year. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iv) ("Clause (iv)") (emphasis
added).
Id.
104. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395(d)(1)(A)(i)). During the years that the PPS was being
incorporated nationwide, the Secretary performed a two-portion reimbursement method that
consisted of a "hospital specific portion" and a "federal rate." Id. The court in Alvarado
Community Hospital explained it as follows:
The "hospital specific portion" was calculated under the prior system, based on the
hospital's actual costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(1)(A), (C). The other portion, the
"federal rate," was determined under PPS. The hospital specific portion of the re-
imbursements was 75% in FY 1984, 50% in FY 1985, 45% in 1986, and 25% in
1987, while the federal rate increased correspondingly. 42 U.S.C. §
1395ww(d)(l)(C). Thereafter, all reimbursements were calculated under PPS.
Id. (citation omitted).
105. Marmor & McKissick, supra note 86, at 233.
106. See Association of American Medical Colleges, Medicare Disproportionate Share
(DSH) Payments, at http://www.aamc.org/advocacy/library/teachhosp/hosp0003.htm (last
visited Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter DSH Payments].
107. Id.
108. Id. "Low income Medicare patients tend to be sicker and more costly to treat than
other Medicare patients with the same diagnosis." Id.
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additions and proposed reforms to PPS, it has gone largely untouched and
continues to be the reimbursement rate used today."°9
B. The Social and Economical Effects of Medicare in the United States
The citizens of the United States have had, and continue to have, serious
concerns about their medical health care coverage because having health care
coverage means having a bit of economic security."' The poor and the eld-
erly have historically been, and continue to be, the groups that would benefit
the most from a national health coverage plan. Hence, the creation of pro-
grams that assist the neediest people first would be the most logical ap-
proach."' Medicare was one of those programs. 12 The program has pro-
vided, and continues to provide, millions of beneficiaries with the medical
coverage they need and a taste of the economic security they seek." 3
According to the statistics provided by the Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration ("HCFA"), Medicare has helped keep millions out of poverty
"[b]y [simply] reducing the amount of money the elderly had to pay for
health care."".4  The statistics showed that before Medicare was imple-
mented, an average of one in every three senior citizens was living at or be-
low poverty level." 5 Senior citizens who were living off of social security
were forced to pay for over fifty-three percent of their health care costs out
of pocket, which generally consumed about twenty-four percent of their so-
cial security checks per month.' 16 In 1997, HCFA statistics showed that on
average, the elderly were paying for only eighteen percent of their medical
expenses out of pocket and that the amount of senior citizens living at or
below poverty level dropped to one in every ten. 17
In addition to the financial assistance provided to the elderly, Medicare
has also improved the quality of life and life expectancy amongst Americans
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww.
110. See CORNING, supra note 1; International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, Social Security/Medicare, at http://www.iamaw.org/politics.asp?n=2&c=857 (last
visited Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter IAMAW].
111. See CORNING, supra note 1; Friedman, supra note 26, at 280. Statistically, the poor
get sicker more often and stay sicker longer than the rich. See DSH Payments, supra note
106.
112. See Friedman, supra note 26, at 280.
113. See id.
114. Id.; see HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, MEDICARE: A PROFILE 33 (2000)
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/35chartbk.pdf [hereinafter PROFILE OF MEDICARE BENEFICI-
ARIES].
115. PROFILE OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, supra note 114, at 33.
116. Id.at33-34.
117. Id.at33.
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in general." 8 The survey conducted by HCFA in 1999 showed that there has
been a dramatic increase in access to medical care and medical coverage
amongst Americans since the inception of Medicare in 1965." 9 The im-
proved health care system has led to a twenty percent increase in the life
expectancy of the average sixty-five year old American. 120 Lastly, Medicare
has improved access to medical care for minority and disabled Americans. 121
In order for hospitals and physicians to participate in the program, the gov-
ernment implemented a non-discrimination policy as a condition to obtain
the federal funds provided from Medicare.
22
Despite all the positive contributions Medicare has imparted thus far,
there continues to be serious issues about the inadequate funding given to
health care.'23 The cost of medical health care continually rises on a yearly
basis due to the constant improvements in medical technology and its infra-
structure, which also results in an increase in Medicare expenditures. 124 Even
with estimated benefit payments that exceed $234,970,769,877, as reported
in the fiscal year of 2001,125 there continues to be a need for more funding
because too many Americans are still going without adequate health care
services. 121
118. Id.
119. Id. The numbers provided by HCFA, in their 2000 profile, were as follows:
"[h]ospital discharges averaged 190 per 1,000 elderly in 1964 and 350 per 1,000 by 1973; the
proportion of elderly using physician services jumped from 68 to 76 percent between 1963
and 1970. [In 1999], more than 94 percent of elderly beneficiaries receive a health care ser-
vice paid for by Medicare." PROFILE OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, supra note 114, at 33.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 34.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 608(d) (2000); see also PROFILE OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, supra note
114, at 34.
123. See Friedman, supra note 26, at 280; JAMAW, supra note 110; Reed Abelson, Hos-
pitals Say They're Penalized by Medicare for Improving Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003, at
Al.
124. RANDALL HAUGHT ET AL., FINANCIAL IMPACT OF IMPROVED MEDICARE
REIMBURSEMENT FOR RURAL HOSPITALS 1-2 (2003), http://www.nrharural.org/blasts/Lewin-
Reach.pdf.
125. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE ESTIMATED BENEFIT
PAYMENTS BY STATE FISCAL YEAR 2001 http://www.cms.hhs.gov/researchers/pubs/datacomp-
endium/2003/03pg7 1.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
126. See David Demko, Empty Wallet New Cause of Elder Death, SENIOR WORLD
ONLINE, at http://www.seniorworld.com/articles/a20000330192223.html (last modified Mar.
30, 2000); Patricia Barry, Chasing Drugs: Many Readers Take Drastic Steps to Get Prescrip-
tion Medicine, AARP BULLETIN ONLINE, Oct. 2003, at http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/prescript-
ion/Articles/a2003-09-29-chasingdrugs.html.
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There are hospitals that are taking significant financial losses each year
simply because they do not receive adequate reimbursements from the Medi-
care program.127 Low reimbursement rates impact more than just hospitals;
they also affect the social and economic status of the United States.128 Gen-
erally, the elderly and the poor are most affected by reductions in govern-
ment programs because they are in the most need for such assistance.121
However, low Medicare reimbursement rates also affect the middle and up-
per classes due to medical providers' "balance billing" techniques, also
known as "cost shifting.""13 "Cost shifting" is the method in which hospitals
make up for their financial losses.11  The costs that hospitals incur from
treating the poor who are not adequately covered by Medicare reimburse-
ments or other such programs are passed onto the rest of the nation through
cost increases. 32  Furthermore, the financial dilemmas that many elderly
Americans are facing today, create the very same nationwide insecurities that
were suppose to be overcome with the creation of Medicare.' 33 Clearly, the
Medicare program has provided some financial relief to an extremely needy
health care system, but the system is still in terrible need of more financial
support.
IV. MEDICARE AS APPLIED TO PUERTO RICO
A. Puerto Rico and Its Integration into the Program
Puerto Rico was originally a Spanish colony from the year 1493 until
1898, the year the Spanish-American War ended and Spain was forced to
surrender the island by virtue of defeat. 134 The island was officially ceded to
127. See Abelson, supra note 123; Press Release, Schumer Unveils Plan to Reverse Im-
pact of Medicare Cuts that Began on October 1 (Oct. 22, 2002), at http://schumer.senate.
gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press releases/PRO1264.html [hereinafter Schumer Unveils
Plan].
128. See HAUGHT, supra note 124, at 1-2; Abelson, supra note 123; CORNING, supra note
1, at 78, 102; Friedman, supra note 26, at 280; Marmor & McKissick, supra note 86, at 231.
129. See IAMAW, supra note 110.
130. Physicians Payments, supra note 83. See also CORNING, supra note 1, at 78, 102;
FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 280.
131. FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 280.
132. Id.
133. See IAMAW, supra note 110; CORNING, supra note 1, at 28-33; Demko, supra note
126; Barry, supra note 126.
134. Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
The Commonwealth Relationship, at http://www.pridco.com/english/overview/2.2prover-
viewcommonwealth.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) [hereinafter The Commonwealth Rela-
tionship].
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the United States in the Treaty of Paris in 1898.' By 1900, the United
States Congress passed the Foraker Act, which set up a United States gov-
ernment system in Puerto Rico with a United States governor, an upper legis-
lative chamber, an elected house of delegates, and "Congress was given the
right to review all legislation.'
' 36
The island slowly obtained more and more autonomy as the years
passed. 37 For instance, the people of Puerto Rico were granted United States
citizenship in 1917 under the Jones Act, and by 1948, the governor of Puerto
Rico was no longer appointed by the United States President; the Puerto Ri-
can people were given the right to have a popular election in order to elect
their own governor.'38 Finally, the island was proclaimed a Commonwealth
in 1952 through operation of Law 600 of 1952, which continues to be its
status today. 139 As a Commonwealth of the United States, the island operates
under both its own laws and Constitution and the laws and Constitution of
the United States.1 40 The Commonwealth is not allowed to vote in the gen-
eral elections,'4 ' nor does it have a vote in Congress. 42 However, its people
are allowed to vote in the presidential primaries, have a non-voting seat in
the United States House of Representatives, and are represented in Congress
by an elected Resident Commissioner.143
The residents of Puerto Rico are subject to many United States laws.'44
As participants in the United States Medicare System, the residents of Puerto
Rico are particularly subject to the Medicare legislation set out by Con-
gress. 45 The residents of Puerto Rico contribute to the Medicare fund and in
return, they are entitled to benefits. 4 6 Prior to 1983, Medicare reimburse-
135. COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, ENCYCLOPEDIA .COM, PUERTO RICO, at http://www.ency-
clopedia.com/htmlI/section/puertori-history.asp (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
136. Id.
137. The Commonwealth Relationship, supra note 134; COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 135.
138. COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 135.
139. Commonwealth Relationship, supra note 134.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Jamin Raskin, A Right-to- Vote Amendment for the U.S. Constitution: Confronting
America s Structural Democracy Deficit, 3 ELECTION L.J. 559, 565 (2004).
143. Commonwealth Relationship, supra note 134.
144. Id.
145. See Hosp. San Rafael, Inc. v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 927, 930 (D.P.R. 1991).
146. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TEMA 903 - IMPUESTOS PATRONALES (FEDERALES) EN
PUERTO RICO, at http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc903.html [hereinafter TEMA 903]. Puerto
Rico and the rest of the United States are taxed 6.2% of their first eighty-seven thousand dol-
lars earned in a year in order to fund social security and 1.45% of their entire yearly wages in
order to fund Medicare. Id.
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ments to all qualified participants were based on the same cost-based system,
where the health care providers were reimbursed based on their actual
costs. 14 7 However, since the implementation of PPS in 1983, the reimburse-
ment rates for Puerto Rico qualified Medicare providers has been much
lower than the rates given to the providers located in the states. 48
The integration of PPS, among the mainland states, began in 1983 and it
took four years before the system was fully implemented across all Medicare
participating hospitals. 49 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986
("OBRA") initiated PPS in Puerto Rico, but it was not actually implemented
until September of 1987.150 PPS was made applicable to Puerto Rico in a
different manner than it was applied in the mainland states.' 5 ' OBRA pre-
sented a seven-step process that was to be applied in order to determine the
PPS rate for Puerto Rican Medicare providers.'52 The system was adequately
summarized in Hospital San Rafael v. Sullivan15 3 as follows:
(1) Determination of Target Amounts
The Secretary first determines the "target amount" for each
participating Puerto Rico Hospital. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(A).
The target amount represents the actual costs home by each hospi-
tal in a base year. The use of these target amounts as the basis for
determining PPS rates is meant to insure that payment under PPS
will closely approximate the actual economic experiences of
Puerto Rico hospitals.
(2) Updating the Target Amounts
The target amounts are then updated for inflation to mid-
fiscal year 1988 levels by prorating the applicable percentage in-
crease for fiscal year 1988. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(B).
(3) Standardizing the Target Amounts
After arriving at updated target amounts.., the Secretary [is]
to remove distorting effects stemming from several sources, in-
147. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 929 (D.P.R. 1991) (referencing Title XVIII of the Social
Security Act, 79 Stat. 291, amended by, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 etseq.).
148. See id. at 929-32.
149. Id. at 930.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 930-32.
153. Id. at 927.
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cluding variations in area wage levels. 42 U.S.C. §§
1395ww(d)(2)(C)(ii), 1395ww(d)(9)(B)(ii); See generally 52 Fed.
Reg. 33,034, 33,066 (Sept. 1, 1987)...
(4) Determination of the Discharge- Weighted Average
Following the standardizing of the target amounts, the Secre-
tary determines the average standardized amount per discharge in
urban and rural settings for Puerto Rico. 42 U.S.C. §
1395ww(d)(9)(B)(iii). These amounts are arrived at by first de-
termining the total labor-related and nonlabor-related standardized
costs for urban and rural areas of Puerto Rico. This is reached by
adding the target amounts for each hospital in each area. The four
total costs are divided by the total number of discharges in urban
and rural areas, respectively. This process yields four standardized
average amounts per discharge: two for labor and nonlabor costs in
Puerto Rico's urban areas; and two for labor and nonlabor costs in
Puerto Rico's rural areas. See 52 Fed. Reg. at 33,062, 33,070, Ta-
ble Ic.
(5) Adjustment for Outlier Payments
The Secretary is . . . to adjust the average standardized
amounts to account for [outlier] payments by estimating the degree
to which outlier payments will be made in each urban and rural
area. The average standardized amounts are then reduced propor-
tionally.
(6) Adjustment for Differences in Area Wage Levels
The Secretary reemploys the wage index to adjust the aver-
age urban and rural standardized amounts, arrived at in steps one
through five, to account for variations in area wage levels. 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(9)(B)(vi). This is done by multiplying the
labor-related portion of the average standardized amounts by the
"appropriate wage index for the area in which the hospital is lo-
cated." 52 Fed. Reg. at 33,065. The use of the wage index here
differs from the use of the wage index to adjust for variations in
area wages discussed in the context of step three .... Here, the
discharge-weighted average standardized amounts are multiplied
by the appropriate wage index.
(7) Determination of Payment Rates Per DRG
The final step in determining PPS rates for Puerto Rico hos-
pitals involves the addition of the average adjusted standardized
[Vol. 29:2:311
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labor-related amount for urban areas, arrived at in step six, to the
nonlabor-related average standardized amount for urban areas.
The average standardized amounts for rural areas are similarly
added. The total adjusted average standardized urban amount per
discharge is then multiplied by the predetermined weighting factor
corresponding to a particular DRG. This product determines the
payment rate for that ailment rendered at a hospital in either an ur-
ban or rural area. Since Congress has specified that the overall
PPS payment rate for Puerto Rico providers is to consist of a blend
of seventy-five percent of a Puerto Rico adjusted rate and twenty-
five percent of the national rate, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww(d)(9)(A);
42 C.F.R. section 412.204, seventy-five percent of this figure is
added to twenty-five percent of the national rate for the same DRG
to reach the overall amount to be paid to the Puerto Rico hospi-
tai. 15
4
Since Sullivan, the reimbursement rate has undergone some reform in
regards to how it applies to Puerto Rico. 155 Originally, the PPS payment rate
for Puerto Rico consisted of a blend of seventy-five percent based on the
Puerto Rico adjusted rate and twenty-five percent based on the national ad-
justed rate.156 From the inception of PPS, the people of Puerto Rico would
have preferred a reimbursement rate solely based on national rates, just like
the one applied to the mainland states, but unfortunately, that was not the
case.' 57 The special PPS rate resulted in lower federal funds being supplied
to Puerto Rico, which was appealing to many because it helped keep Medi-
care costs down. 58 The Commonwealth also had to contend with the fact
that it did not have any voting representation in Congress, which made it
154. Id. (internal footnotes omitted). The court went on to explain how wages were also
taken into consideration in order to better standardize the target amounts:
To effect this standardization for the cost variation at issue in this action-
differences in area wage levels-the Secretary first divides the target amounts into
labor and nonlabor components derived from the national hospital market basket.
This division is necessary since wages correspond only to the labor-related costs of
a hospital. The labor component is 74.39% of each hospital's updated target
amount. 52 Fed. Reg. at 33,044. In order to remove the effect of disparate wages,
this labor component is divided by a wage index for the geographic area in which
each hospital is located. This yields a standardized target amount taking into ac-
count variations in area wage levels.
Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 930-31. The hospital market basket is a price index compiled from
prices of various categories of goods and services purchased by hospitals across the nation,
including Puerto Rico. Id. at 930 n.4.
155. See Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5.
156. See Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 932; Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra
note 5.
157. Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5.
158. Id.
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virtually impossible for the Commonwealth to obtain the reimbursement rate
its people wanted. 159 Ultimately, the implementation of the special formula
was justified at the time by the fact that costs in Puerto Rico were drastically
lower than the rest of the nation; thus, this resulted in the need to provide the
island with more financial backing was not pressing."
By 1997, due to a strong lobbying effort from the Resident Commis-
sioner of Puerto Rico, assistance from democratic representatives in Con-
gress, and a strong push from the Clinton Administration, the Puerto Rico
reimbursement rate was amended. 1 ' The newly amended rate was now
based on fifty percent of the Puerto Rico adjusted rate and fifty percent of the
national rate. 6 2 The rate change made an immediate and apparent contribu-
tion within the first year of its implementation, when it provided the island
hospitals an additional $44 million in health care assistance.'63 The Clinton
Administration attempted to achieve another amendment to the reimburse-
ment rate in 2000 by proposing that the rate be based on seventy-five percent
of the national adjustment rate and only twenty-five percent on the Puerto
Rico rate1 64 This proposal was heavily opposed in Congress and was ulti-
mately denied. 16
5
The "fifty-fifty" reimbursement rate remained in place until its amend-
ment under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modemiza-
tion Act of 2003 ("Modernization Act"). 6 Initially presented under the
Medicare Puerto Rico Hospital Payment Parity Act of 2003 ("the Parity
Act"), the proposed amendment presented itself as a second chance at chang-
ing the Puerto Rico rate from "fifty-fifty" to seventy-five percent national
adjustment rates and twenty-five percent Puerto Rico rates.167 On December
8, 2003, the amendment was included within the newly approved Moderniza-
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. Leading the lobby for equality in the reimbursement rates was then-Resident
Commissioner of Puerto Rico, Carlos Romero-Barcelo and then-Governor of Puerto Rico,
Pedro Rossello. Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5. Other politicians and
organizations that provided much needed support was then-House Hispanic Caucus Chair
Xavier Becerra (D-CA), Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), the Puerto Rican Hospital Association,
the New York Hospital Association, and Puerto Rico's Association's Lobbyists. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. The additional funding range estimated at the time anticipated an increase in
funds from $50 million to $75 million a year. Id.
164. Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5.
165. Id.
166. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 504, 117 Stat. 2066, 2292-93 (2003).
167. Medicare Puerto Rico Hospital Payment Parity Act of 2003, S. 653, 108th Cong. § 2
(2003).
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tion Act signed by President George W. Bush.168 Although the amendment
went against President Bush's objective of luring "people away from a reli-
ance on Medicare to private insurance plans to reduce costs," a compromise
was reached and the amendment went forward. 1
69
The amendment to the Modernization Act proposes a gradual change
toward the new percentages. Starting April 1, 2004, through October 1,
2004, "the applicable Puerto Rico percentage [will be] 37.5 percent and the
applicable federal percentage [will be] 62.5 percent."' 170 The percentages will
then take final form starting and continuing on from October 1, 2004, at the
rate of twenty-five percent based on the applicable Puerto Rico percentage,
and seventy-five percent based on the federal percentage.' 7' The Resident
Commissioner of Puerto Rico, Anibal Acevedo Vila, anticipates that the
amended rates will provide the health care system in Puerto Rico with an
average of $300 million per year over the next decade.172 Vila also claims
that the amendment will provide prescription drug coverage for an additional
250,000 Medicare enrollees on the island that were presently not receiving
any such coverage. 73 The amendment has significantly advanced Puerto
Rico's pursuit toward equalizing the reimbursement rates, but there is still
much room for progress. 7
4
B. A Closer Look at the Special Reimbursement Rate
Currently, and in years prior, Puerto Ricans have been subject to the
same Social Security and Medicare taxes as any other U.S. citizen. 175 In or-
der to fund Social Security, the first $87,000 made each year, by all employ-
168. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 §
504; Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5.
169. Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5. President Bush attempted to
lure people away from Medicare by creating outpatient prescription drug benefits that would
provide incentives for people to move toward more of a private insurance plan basis. Id.
Ultimately, the compromise was that the new "legislation would provide equal prescription
drug subsidies under both Medicare and private insurance plans." Id.
170. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 504, 117 Stat. 2066, 2292-93 (2003).
171. Id.
172. Significativo el Impacto, supra note 5.
173. Id.
174. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 §
504; Significativo el Impacto, supra note 5.
175. TEMA 903, supra note 146; see also SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, SOCIAL SECURITY &
MEDICARE TAX RATES, at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/taxRates.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2005).
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ees in the United States and in Puerto Rico, are subject to a 6.2 percent tax. 176
Likewise, Medicare is funded by imposing a 1.45 percent tax on all income
made by employees in a year. 177 Despite being subject to the same Medicare
and Social Security taxes, participating hospitals on the island are subject to
special reimbursement rates, which result in lesser payment levels. 78 Ac-
cording to Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 560,725 Puerto Ri-
cans were enrolled in the Medicare program in 2002,179 and the Medicare
participating hospitals on the island received an average reimbursement of
$2842 per patient, while the participating hospitals within the fifty states
received an average reimbursement of $3780 per patient. 180
Providing adequate medical care is already an extremely difficult task
without the added disadvantage of smaller reimbursement rates.'18  For in-
stance, United States hospitals continue to face serious funding issues despite
the fact that they receive reimbursements based on the more favorable na-
tional rate. 182 As previously discussed, state hospitals claim that the threat of
the slightest reduction in reimbursement rates would cause a loss of millions
of dollars in funding and would lead to hospitals taking even more losses
each time they treat a patient. 83 There are also numerous stories about eld-
erly people in the United States dying more frequently from the inability to
afford adequate health care than from old age itself. 84 All these events are
taking place in the richest country in the world, where according to the
United States Census Bureau calculations of 2000, the median family income
in the United States was $50,046.'85 Puerto Rico, on the other hand, had a
176. TEMA 903, supra note 146.
177. Id.
178. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 504, § 1886(d)(9), 117 Stat. 2066, 2292-93 (2003); Hosp. San Rafael, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 927, 930-32 (D.P.R. 1991); Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare,
supra note 5.
179. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE ENROLLMENT BY STATE
2002, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/researchers/pubs/datacompendium/2003/03pg74.pdf (Nov.
2003).
180. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE HOME HEALTH AGENCY
UTILIZATION BY STATE CALENDAR YEAR 2002, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/feeforserv-
ice/HHAUtil02.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
181. See generally Barry, supra note 126; Schumer Unveils Plan, supra note 127; Demko,
supra note 126.
182. See generally Schumer Unveils Plan, supra note 127; Demko, supra note 126.
183. See Schumer Unveils Plan, supra note 127; Barry, supra note 126.
184. Demko, supra note 126.
185. Id.; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003 826,
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/03statab/outlying.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) [here-
inafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
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median family income of $16,543 in 2000,186 which means that in addition to
coping with the constant increases in medical technology and costs, the is-
land's hospitals also deal with the added financial pressures of treating low-
income patients. 87 Despite all these factors, Puerto Rico is still reimbursed
at a lower rate than the fifty states.'88
The reimbursement rates given to Puerto Rico have been judicially chal-
lenged in the past.189 In Sullivan, a number of Puerto Rican hospitals raised a
direct challenge to the implementation of PPS for Medicare rates for hospi-
tals in Puerto Rico.' 90 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the wage
index was determined arbitrarily, the reliance on the national hospital market
basket to calculate the wage index was contrary to law because the data is
not exclusively based on Puerto Rico numbers, and that the "Puerto Rico
PPS statute violates the Equal Protection clause of the United States Consti-
tution because it results in a lower level of payment to Puerto Rico hospitals,
which are owned, operated, and staffed predominately by Hispanic per-
sons."'9 1 The court rejected each of the plaintiffs' challenges. 92 Under the
wage index claim, the plaintiffs argued that the Commonwealth hospitals,
which are not subject to minimum wage regulations, and federal hospitals,
whose pay scales are higher than the national norm, equally distort wage
indices; hence, both should be excluded from the wage index calculation.' 93
According to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services (the "Secretary"), the federal hospitals were excluded from the cal-
culations because they did not participate in the Medicare program, while the
Commonwealth hospitals were included because they generally did partici-
pate in the program. 94 The court stated that their job was not to determine
the reasonableness of the calculations, but rather they were to look at the
explanation of the methodology to determine if the calculations were arbi-
trary or capricious."' They then concluded that the calculations were not
arbitrary or capricious because the methodology used was logically related to
186. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 185, at 827.
187. See DSH Payments, supra note 106.
188. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 504, 117 Stat. 2006, 2292-93 (2003).
189. See Hosp. San Rafael, Inc. v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 927 (D.P.R. 1991); Harris v.
Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980).
190. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 929.
191. Id. at 932-33.
192. Id. at 940.
193. Id. at 934-35.
194. Id. at 935.
195. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 936.
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the means used and the purpose achieved.'96 Next, the court rejected the
argument that the use of the national market basket was contrary to law.'
97
The plaintiffs argued that the statute requires that "a Puerto Rico adjusted
DRG prospective payment rate" be established in order to determine the ap-
plicable wage index; thus, the use of separate labor and non-labor rates spe-
cific to Puerto Rico must be used.'9 8 It was conceded that the Puerto Rico
labor costs were lower than the national labor costs and that such a factor
does alter the results. 199 However, the court held that incorporating the per-
centage difference would be so trifling that it did not warrant interfering with
the methodology currently in place. °°
Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that Congress violated the Equal Protection
clause of the United States Constitution when it created a method to deter-
mine Puerto Rico's PPS rates that was different than that utilized by the rest
of the nation.20' In denying the equal protection claim, the court first rea-
soned that entitlement to Medicare reimbursements is not a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution.2 2 However, creating a burden on a
suspect class, such as Hispanics, deserves strict scrutiny. 203 The court ulti-
mately decided that the statute did not appear to be racially based and that
the plaintiffs' claim that the different methodology result in less reimburse-
ment payments to Puerto Rico, lacked factual support.2 °4 The court further
supported their denial of the equal protection claim by holding that the Terri-
tory Clause of the Constitution gave Congress "the power to treat Puerto
Rico differently from States if there is a rational basis for doing so.' '205 The
Court, making reference to the Supreme Court decision of Harris v.
Rosario,2 °6 then laid out the rational basis factors that justified Congress'
actions in treating Puerto Rico differently when allotting funds:
(1) Puerto Ricans do not contribute to the federal treasury; (2) high
costs of treating Puerto Rico as a state for purposes of the statute;
(3) the possibility that greater benefits might disrupt the economy
of Puerto Rico. Rosario, 446 U.S. at 652, 100 S.Ct. at 1930. These
196. Id.
197. Id. at 937.
198. Id. at 936 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(9)(B) (2004)).
199. Id. at 937.
200. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 937.
201. Id. at 939.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 939-40.
205. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940.
206. 446 U.S. 651 (1980).
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factors, as well as the unique economic circumstances attributable
to Puerto Rico, support Congress' decision to prescribe a separate
PPS rate for Puerto Rico.2 °7
The arguments made by the Secretary, and the reasons provided by the
Sullivan court for its ruling, were contradictory to the facts and lacked ade-
quate support.208 In Sullivan, the Secretary made it a point to account for all
Medicare participants equally, which is why all participating Commonwealth
hospitals, even those without minimum wage regulations, were included in
the national market basket to calculate applicable wage indices.29 Appar-
ently, the parity that exists when calculating overall PPS rates does not apply
when it comes time to make actual PPS payments. 210 At the beginning of the
PPS process, Puerto Rico is treated like any other Medicare participant.
21
'
"Puerto Ricans are expected to pay" the same tax rate to fund the Medicare
program, and no special treatments are rendered while the majority of the
PPS rate is being determined; that is, until it is time to actually distribute
212payments. 2 At the point of distribution, a Puerto Rico specific rate is
blended in with the national rate in order to determine the Puerto Rico pay-
ment, which ultimately results in lower levels of payments for Puerto Rico
hospitals.213
In justifying the special treatment, the court in Sullivan, citing to the
Constitution and Rosario, stated that Congress has the power to treat Puerto
Rico differently from the states, under the Territory Clause, so long as there
is a rational basis for doing so. 21 4 The exact wording under the Territory
Clause is as follows: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of
any particular State."2 5 On its face the clause does not contain any wording
that allows Congress to "treat Puerto Rico differently from States if there is a
207. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940.
208. See id.
209. Id. at 935.
210. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 504, 117 Stat. 2066, 2292-93 (2003); see also Hosp. San Rafael, Inc. v. Sulli-
van, 784 F. Supp. 927, 935 (D.P.R. 1991).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2000); TEMA 903, supra note 146.
212. See TEMA 903, supra note 146.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(9)(E) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
214. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3; Harris v. Rosario, 446
U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980) (Marshal, J. dissenting), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 912 (1980)).
215. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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rational basis for doing so., '216 Furthermore, the dissenting opinion in
Rosario accurately pointed out that the majority did not cite any authority for
the proposition, and that the statement made by the majority was overbroad
and unsupported. 2 7 The dissenting opinion went on to say that the United
States must be careful as to how differently it treats Puerto Rico because
Puerto Ricans are United States citizens who are entitled to many constitu-
tional rights, such as the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." 8
The rational basis factors provided by the Sullivan court, in support of
the statute enacted by Congress, also lacked support.219 First, the rationale
that Puerto Rico does not contribute to the Federal Treasury was not applica-
ble with regards to the Medicare program in Puerto Rico, because Puerto
Rico contributes to the Medicare fund in the same manner as all other Medi-
care participants.12 0 Likewise, treating Puerto Rico as a state when it comes
to the PPS payments is no more costly than when it is treated as a state for
Medicare taxing purposes.221 Puerto Rico contributes to the Medicare pro-
gram at the same tax rate as all other states;222 hence, it should be reimbursed
in the same manner as all other states. Next, the rationale that greater bene-
fits might disrupt the Puerto Rican economy was viewed as having "trou-
bling overtones" by the dissent in Rosario, and it appears to have the same
defect in Sullivan.223 The dissent in Rosario stated that the rationale suggests
that programs designed to help the poor should be scarcely applied in areas
where the need is greater because such aid will disrupt the poverty levels in
those areas.224 Moreover, the dissenting opinion stated that the theory sug-
gests that those areas of the country that are the most economically sound
would receive the most funding because that is where the aid will cause the
least amount of disruption.25 The anticipated economic effects and so called
"unique economic circumstances attributable to Puerto Rico," that suppos-
edly justify the special Puerto Rico PPS rate, are irrational and lack any evi-
dence to support said rationales.226
216. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940.
217. Rosario, 446 U.S. at 653.
218. Id.
219. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940.
220. TEMA 903, supra note 146.
215. Id.
222. Id.
223. Rosario, 446 U.S. at 655; see also Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940.
224. Rosario, 446 U.S. at 655-56.
225. Id. at 656.
226. See id. at 652-56; Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940.
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V. CONCLUSION
Puerto Rico is not a state, thus treating it with full statehood privileges
may not be justified.227 Yet, there are compelling reasons for providing
equality in the administration of a government program such as Medicare.
Puerto Rico, as well as the United States, will benefit from a healthier Puerto
Rico. 228 Puerto Ricans are United States citizens, therefore, the well-being of
Puerto Rico residents would improve the well-being and economic status of
United States citizens overall. 229 Furthermore, Puerto Ricans should also be
entitled to the full benefits of the program, since they are subject to the same
contribution rates that all other participants are mandated to pay. 3° Anything
less than equal treatment under such circumstances is unjustifiable.
In the Emily Friedman article, The Compromise and the Afterthought:
Medicare and Medicaid After 30 Years, she quotes, "It is both a flaw and a
strength of human nature that one tends to forget the circumstances that sur-
rounded the need for and that shaped certain decisions and actions., 231 In the
instant case, it is flaw for the United States to forget the circumstances that
led us to the formation of Medicare.232 The program was designed to provide
the needy, predominantly the elderly, with adequate health care so as to
avoid the economic insecurities that loom over an unhealthy society. 3  To-
day, in a time where the improvements in medical technology and medica-
tions are increasingly costly, the need for medical funding assistance contin-
227. See Rosario, 446 U.S. at 652; Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940; The Commonwealth
Relationship, supra note 134.
228. See Rosario, 446 U.S. at 653; THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS EASTERN
REGIONAL CONFERENCE, PROMOTING FEDERAL ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PUERTO RICO
(2002), at http://www.csgeast.org/page.asp?id=2002puertoricores [hereinafter PROMOTING
FEDERAL ECONOMIC INCENTIVES]. The United States benefits from a prosperous Puerto Rico
because Puerto Rico is the tenth largest trading partner of the United States. Id. Puerto Rico
purchases over $16 billion worth of goods from the United States every year, which results in
over 180,000 jobs. Id. Furthermore, a prosperous Puerto Rico also creates more jobs on the
island, thus resulting in "less welfare in Puerto Rico, which leads to more Social Security,
Medicare and federal payroll taxes for the United States." Id. For instance, in 2001 Puerto
Rico contributed $20.90 billion in Medicare taxable earnings and $19.14 billion in Social
Security taxable earnings. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, STATE STATISTICS, DECEMBER
2002-PUERTO RICO (2002), at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/state_ stats/pr.html
[hereinafter STATE STATISTICS].
229. See Rosario, 446 U.S. at 653.
230. TEMA 903, supra note 146.
231. Friedman, supra note 26, at 280.
232. See generally CORNING, supra note 1.
233. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2000); CORNING, supra note 1.
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ues to grow. 2 34 Puerto Rico is no exception to the trend.235 As an island with
approximately half of its population living below the poverty line, Puerto
Ricans are prime candidates for a national health care program such as
Medicare and all the benefits it has to offer.236 Currently Puerto Rico is re-
ceiving assistance, and its situation has gotten progressively better.231 This
does not necessarily mean that the system currently in place is adequate.238
In order for Puerto Rico to achieve the parity it deserves, the Medicare pro-
gram will need to undergo further reform with a focus on achieving equality
on the issue of reimbursement once and for all.
234. HAUGHT ET AL., supra note 124, at 1-2. See also Demko, supra note 126; Barry,
supra note 126.
235. See Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5; Significativo el Impacto,
supra note 5.
236. PROMOTING FEDERAL ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note 228.
237. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(9) (2000 & Supp. 2004); Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 504, 117 Stat. 2066,
2292-93 (2003).
238. See Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5; Significativo el Impacto,
supra note 5.
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